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Feminism and the Critique of Violence: negotiating feminist political agency 
 
Abstract 
  
The acute sensitivity of feminism to violence, in its many different forms 
and contexts, makes it a particularly interesting case for the examination 
of the relationship between politics and violence in theory and practice. 
Our purpose in this paper is not to adjudicate the normative question of 
whether feminism implies a commitment to pacifism or to the use of 
non-violence.  Rather, we are interested in examining how the relation 
between feminist politics and violence is construed as feminists struggle 
to develop a politics in which opposition to patriarchal violence is 
central.  We begin with the feminist critique of violence, and move to 
examine how particular articulations of that critique shape and are 
shaped by practices of feminist political agency in specific contestation 
over the goals and strategies of feminism. We use the well-known case of 
feminist debates over the Greenham Common Peace Camp in the UK in 
the 1980s to demonstrate how negotiating women’s political agency in 
relation to opposition to male violence poses problems, both for feminists 
who embrace non-violence and prioritise the opposition to war, and for 
feminists who are suspicious of non-violence and of the association of 
feminism with peace activism. In both cases, the debates over Greenham 
demonstrate the fundamentally political character of the ways in which 
the relation and distinction between violence and politics are 
conceptually and practically negotiated.  
 
Introduction   
 Violence as a theme is theoretically and practically central to the history of feminism.1   
Importantly, feminist thinkers associate violence in personal relations, in particular in marriage and 
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household, with violence in public life, in particular in state punishment, accepted modes of social 
conflict 'resolution',  institutions like armed service, and, of course, inter- and intra-state wars.  The 
idea of a 'continuum of violence' recurs in feminist thought and theory.2   It is emphasised 
differently, of course, in different strains of feminism, but it seems that any analysis of the forms, 
varieties, transformations and contestations of feminist political thinking will always feature 
somewhere an analysis of, and opposition to, violence, in relation to sex and gender, exploitation 
and oppression, economy, culture and /or polity (state). The acute sensitivity of feminism to 
violence, in its many different forms and contexts, makes it a particularly interesting case for the 
examination of the relationship between politics and violence in theory and practice.  
 Our purpose in this paper is not to adjudicate the normative question of whether feminism 
implies a commitment to pacifism or to the use of non-violence.3   Rather, we are interested in 
examining how the relation between feminist politics and violence is construed as feminists 
struggle to develop a politics in which opposition to patriarchal violence is central.  We begin with 
the feminist critique of violence, and move to examine how particular articulations of that critique 
shape and are shaped by practices of feminist political agency in specific contestation over the goals 
and strategies of feminism. We use the well-known case of feminist debates over the Greenham 
Common Peace Camp in the UK in the 1980s to demonstrate how negotiating women’s political 
agency in relation to opposition to male violence poses problems, both for feminists who embrace 
non-violence and prioritise the opposition to war, and for feminists who are suspicious of non-
violence and of the association of feminism with peace activism. These problems illuminate two 
theoretical and practical difficulties for political struggle against violence: first, the problem of how 
to recast the relation between violence and political agency in ways that are consistent with 
opposition to violence; second, and relatedly, the problem of how to determine the boundary 
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between violence and non-violence. In both cases, the debates over Greenham demonstrate the 
fundamentally political character of the ways in which the relation and distinction between violence 
and politics are conceptually and practically negotiated.   
 
Feminist critiques of violence 
 We have said that traditions of feminist thought and action more or less centrally feature 
critiques of violence.  But within feminist politics there are profound lines of disagreement on the 
topic.  Many of the disagreements are strategic.  They focus on the appropriate programmatic place 
for analysis of and action on violence within a wider range of issue and policy matters, and on the 
theoretical and practical implications of various forms of focus on violence.  Bound up with these 
strategic questions are divergent understandings of the ontology and the aetiology of forms of 
violence, and there are also disagreements about the significance or the value of violence.  For some 
political thinkers violence belongs in a cluster of greatest evils; for others it does not have this 
negative quality.  Indeed, in some varieties of feminism, thinkers come close to celebrating violence, 
and to prescribing women's exploration of their own capacities for violence and for other forms of 
transgression.   
 In October 1888, at the height of the scare about 'Jack the Ripper' in London, the Pall Mall 
Gazette - a London evening newspaper which under the editorship of W T Stead from 1883-9 
campaigned about social issues including poverty and child prostitution, and which covered the 
East End murders in some detail - quoted a letter from Florence Fenwick Miller, the suffrage 
campaigner and author of a study of Harriet Martineau, to the Daily News:  
Week by week and month by month, women are kicked, beaten, jumped on until they are 
crushed, chopped, stabbed, seamed with vitriol, bitten, eviscerated with red-hot pokers and 
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deliberately set on fire - and this sort of outrage, if the woman dies, is called 'manslaughter': 
if she lives, it is a common assault. 4 
Fenwick Miller is here participating in an already long tradition of discourse of (about) violence 
against women, about its ubiquity, its deadliness, the lack of seriousness with which it is viewed by 
the dominant culture, state authorities, and the law, and the ambivalence of culture, laws, 
perpetrators and victims alike about responsibility and wrong.    We find this kind of passage in the 
works of Wollstonecraft and her feminist contemporaries in the 1790s, in the work of the socialist 
feminists Anna Wheeler and William Thompson in the 1820s, and those by Harriet Taylor and John 
Stuart Mill in the 1850s and 60s.5 
  Fenwick Miller is making several moves here that are familiar from radical political 
discourse throughout the modern era.  First, there is the argument that moral panics about so-called 
exceptional incidents or events are quite out of place in a public culture which is oblivious to,  in 
denial about, the systematic nature of the conditions and causes of similar daily phenomena which, 
just because of their systematicity and dailiness, count as normal.  Second, it is argued that it must 
be recognised that normalisation is the outcome of a convergence of legal, cultural, interpersonal, 
and economic logics that govern actions.  Individuals are positioned as they are because of laws and 
constraints, resources and opportunities and the lack of these; and from those positions they engage 
in unequal encounters, running particular sets of risks.  Third, patterns of violence predictably 
follow the great social cleavages of class, race, sex, and generation.  Suffering the psychological and 
physical injuries of violence is overwhelmingly more likely for the relatively powerless, and the 
perpetrators of their suffering are overwhelmingly likely to come from the counterpart relatively 
powerful groups  -  children from their parents,  blacks from whites, slaves from masters, women 
from men.  This is quite consistent with fears that run the other way (as white fear of black people's 
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violence), and with prominent public and discursive attention to counter-examples - wives killing 
their husbands, violent and uncontrollable children, or robberies perpetrated by poor people 
against the relatively rich.  Indeed, the record shows that legal and other penalties (including the 
fury of public opinion) are much more severe in these cases than in the cases where the perpetration 
of violence runs from (relatively) powerful to powerless.  Fourth, though, political reconfigurations 
are possible.  We see organised effort to prevent children suffering death or serious harm at the 
hands of carers - with the founding of campaigning and working organisations like the NSPCC in 
the 1880s and 90s.6  Particularly famous killings like the ones in 1888 can concentrate focus on legal 
or cultural double standards, or police inaction, or economic constraints, incentives, risks and 
snares.  Prostitute workers can protest that 'violence is not part of the job description'.7   Academic 
research, and activist interventions like Mrs Fenwick Miller's, publicly articulate new analyses and 
understandings of daily reality.   
 As with all political actions and interventions, the results can be paradoxical or 
contradictory.  The extent to which intended consequences actually transpire is highly doubtful, 
even if there are clear and agreed intentions among the collective political actors to begin with.  The 
politics of the organisation and action itself can seem to squeeze out the pursuit of the original 
cause.  Large bureaucratic organisations - like the NSPCC - find their charitable and their 
campaigning aims in tension.  Nevertheless, this and countless other organisations effectively 
politicise relationships and social phenomena that were hitherto unchallenged.  Henceforth, 
assertions about the cultural and discursive status of violence against women have a politically 
paradoxical quality.    
 Another reason for paradoxical or contradictory results of political action against violence 
against women lies in sheer disagreement. The identification of ‘feminism’ as a distinct ideology 
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involves negotiation between subjective self-articulations by self-styled identifiers, the 
characterisation of positions by critics and rivals, and diverse articulations of a theoretical or 
historical voice.  To add to this complexity, in the case of women's movements, in particular but not 
only in the final third of the twentieth century and after, the claims of an 'autonomous women's 
movement' are caught in a struggle between the logics of purity and schism, and the logics of 
coalition and loss of principle.8  Historically, it is clear that there are, and can be, political moments 
at which feminist aspirations can be articulated in settings whose participants have shaken free 
from pre-existing commitments to other party and programmatic positions.  For example, the late 
twentieth century saw women in western Europe and north America organise independently of 
labour movement and left civil rights structures.  Immediately, though, the women's movement 
with its programmatic demands for equal pay, equal education and work opportunities, 
reproductive rights in contraception and abortion, free childcare, sexual self-determination, legal 
and financial independence, and freedom from sexual coercion and violence based on gender, had 
to enter into relationships with socialists, liberals, participants and formations from other radical 
social movements such as environmentalists, peace activists, gay movements; and finally into 
relationship with governments from a variety of positions on the party political spectrum.  The 
relativity of such 'autonomy' from pre-existing political contexts, and the reality of subsequent 
negotiations, make sense of the subsequent inevitable diversity in analyses of violence.  From 
diverse political contexts, diverse forms of violence become politically salient - the susceptibility of 
sex workers to beatings or murder, the liability of children to violence at home or at school, the risk 
to daughters of kidnap or forced marriage, the risks to wives of legalised forced sexual intercourse, 
the bullying of soldiers or police officers or practitioners of the professions.  
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Feminists disagree about the centrality of the theme of violence to their political projects, 
about the nature of violence, and about its causes and consequences.  Within feminist theory in the 
large the concept violence signifies a wide and heterogeneous range of phenomena and actions, and 
contentions within feminism are in part contentions over its proper analysis and use.  In our 
analysis, the problem in specific cases is often that parties to disputes focus on different dimensions 
or levels of the concept and theory of violence.  Our tabular scheme represents our effort to make 
sense of debates within feminism about violence and non-violence, focussing mainly on the period 
of the 1980s and early 90s.9  It is important, methodologically and substantively, to be clear that this 
is not a scheme of positions held, as such, by the theorists and thinkers whose work we have 
analysed.  It is, rather, a scheme of analytically distinct dimensions along which contributors to 
debates, according to our analysis, are ranged.  We do not imply that the parties to disputes 
themselves articulate their positions by reference to these dimensions.  In particular, it is not 
implied that we can fit named contributors to the debates into any single cell in our table.  Rather, 
the dimensions and the cells are a means for us to try to specify exactly where points of 
disagreement, and uncertainty, are.  They are also a means for us to see how theorists and thinkers 
negotiate coherent positions vis a vis their critics.   
 
8 
 
Table 1: Analyses of the ontology and aetiology of violence, by its value significance, and by 
political strategy:  
 
 
In this scheme we distinguish several analytically independent dimensions of disagreement 
between feminist analyses and positions.  First (Column 1), there is disagreement between 
contrasting understandings of the basis of violence. Schematically, we can identify a range of 
understandings in this connection, from thinkers who understand violence as a matter of human, or 
animal, physiology or biology (a), to those for whom the nature and workings of violence in social 
life are socially made and rooted (b).  We should add that this can't be a clear binary scheme: 
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psychoanalytic accounts of the place of violence in social and pyschic life, for example, can 
participate in either a physiological, or a socially materialist, understanding, or more usually in 
some combination of these.   
  One's position regarding what we can think of as the ontology of violence in social life, is 
independent, logically speaking, from one's view of the explanatory importance of violence in social 
theory (Column 2).  There is disagreement between feminists who understand violence to be 
explanatorily fundamental - fundamental to structures of advantage and disadvantage, and to 
distributions to benefits and burdens; fundamentally explanatory of social meanings and values (c 
and d).  Critics (e) deny any such explanatory significance or power.  For them, this kind of feminist 
explanation misunderstands the aetiology of the structures, distributions and meanings we inhabit, 
which are caused by, for example, capitalist exploitation, or by irrational value commitments.  Thus, 
any focus on violence as such, or male violence in particular, mistakes effect for cause, an 
epiphenomenon for a causal reality.  Yet another independent dimension of disagreement 
(Columns 3, 4 and 5) is over the value significance of violence.  At one extreme, for many critics, 
violence is the great evil, if not the worst (f, g, h, k).   For others, at the other extreme, it is either 
morally speaking insignificant (n), or if not insignificant then at least not the worst thing.  A focus 
on violence can be criticised as a puritanical obsession (p).  Or violence can be celebrated as 
transgressive (q).   A number of theorists who resist the association of violence and gender, 
although they acknowledge the social construction of that association, argue that we need to 
explore the relationship between femininity and violence (j).   
 Commitment to a social-materialist basis of violence (b) is consistent either with the idea that 
violence is causally fundamental (d) or that it is epiphenomenal (e).   Commitment to the 
fundamental causal significance of violence in social life (c or d) is consistent either with the view 
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that it is also morally and politically very important, for good or bad,  or with the view that violence 
is not of great, or the greatest, value significance.  These positions on ontology, aetiology, and value 
significance, interact with perceptions of the possibilities for effective action.   Strategic 
commitments and choices are frequently justified by reference to these explanatory and ontological 
levels.  However, it is not the case that a ontological or causal analysis straightforwardly generates a 
strategic choice.  As we shall go on to see, disputes between feminists about the politics of violence 
are best understood as revolving around the nexus of ontology, explanation, value, and strategy.   
 We can't here cover all the feminist contentions that are encompassed by this analytic 
scheme. In what follows we focus on the series of engagements that are picked out in column 3, and 
exemplified in the 1980s debates surrounding Greenham Common and the relation between 
feminism, anti-militarism and non-violence.  In particular, we look at how feminist thinkers and 
activists whose politics was centred on action against violence against women (h), conducted a 
contentious engagement on two fronts.  First, they opposed action that yoked feminism together 
with anti-nuclear pacifism and non-violence (f and g).  Second, they opposed a series of feminist 
coalitions with socialism or liberalism (k and m).  In both cases the understanding of violence, and 
the implications of that for resistant political agency (strategy and tactics), is at the centre of 
contention.    
 
Feminist contestations over non-violence 
 The resurgence of the anti-nuclear weapons and anti-war campaigns and movements in 
1980 was characterised by mass demonstrations across western Europe and by the relatively novel 
tactic of permanent camps at military bases, which stood as a witness to wrong and a symbolisation 
of right, and were the sites of direct resistance to state action.10  The questions of feminism and 
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gender were immediately raised, in an acute way, as women participants in these direct actions and 
organisations had to negotiate the familiar matters of styles of organisation and action, the sexual 
division of labour, domination and leadership, and questions of masculinity and femininity 
inevitably rose up the agenda.  Many women activists and campaigners were already working both 
theoretically and practically on the relationship between feminism and pacifism, and on the matter 
of sex and gender in relation to political organisation.11  
 The Feminism and Nonviolence Study Group produced Piecing It Together in 1983. This co-
authored work put forward a series of arguments representative of UK feminists of the time who 
saw feminism, the opposition to nuclear weapons and non-violence as necessarily connected.   
It has become clear to us that resistance to war and to the use of nuclear weapons is 
impossible without resistance to sexism, to racism, to imperialism and to violence as an 
everyday pervasive reality. There is a profound relationship between the fact that individual 
women are commonly attacked and beaten up and that a nuclear war threatens the entire 
world. 12 
The analysis of this work is well exemplified by their argument that 'resistance to war is impossible 
without resistance to sexism'.  State violence, in particular inter-state wars, have to be understood in 
the context of everyday violence including of course sexual and domestic violence, as well as the 
interpersonal violences that are understood as a response to stress and aggression, and are best 
theorised in relation to the 'systematic violences' of poverty, hunger, racism and so on.13  Resistance 
to war, then, is the starting point for this group.  An understanding of sexism, and of the gender 
system in relation to violence, makes feminism a necessary condition for this project.  Piecing it 
Together, as with other sources reflecting a similar position at the time, relates the celebration and 
'fun' of violence in popular cultural forms like film, to the socialisation of children into gender roles, 
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and to the enforcement of gender distinction in the labour market, in education, and in the state 
management of women as a 'reserve army of labour' in particular in times of war.  Gender 
distinction is also symbolised in 'man's' treatment of 'nature'.14  In short, the ideologies of patriarchy, 
capitalism, and the state, interact, via the medium of violent institutions, to maintain and 
perpetuate familiar social relations.15  In response, political actors have to make decisions about 
strategy and tactics.  Nonviolence cannot protect resisters from violence; but uses of violence 
inevitably bring negative consequences.16    Critical insights of feminism include the principles that 
we should not mirror the behaviour and methods of the oppressive system, that all women can 
make changes in their own lives, and that 'nothing that happens in personal life is without meaning 
in public life'.17     The women's peace movement, and the peace movement more generally, are 
strands in a broader skein of intertwined movements for social change.18 
 There are several points to note about this analysis.  First, it is what we are calling 'socially 
materialist' (cell b in Table 1).  Sex differences, inequalities in distribution of resources, and patterns 
of inequality and exploitation, have to be understood as material, rather than as ideal, as reflective 
of some metaphysical order of reality.  They are not to be thought of as 'essential' in any sense - 
quite the reverse, they must be thought of as contingent, accidental.  But we must be clear about 
their inter-personal reality: exploitation is done by exploiters, oppression by oppressors, violence by 
violent actors.  The concept 'system' is used in this analysis;  but systems are emergent properties of 
concrete action and interaction, of distributions and their maintenance by interested parties, of 
decisions and their enforcements by the relatively powerful and authoritative.  The materiality is 
social; it cannot be straightforwardly inferred from the level of biology or physiology.   
Second, violence is here identified as key to the maintenance of the sex-gender system (cell d), 
and to patterns of inter-state and interpersonal and social conflict.  Violence is absolutely central to 
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social and political reality, on this view - it is fateful for individuals and causal in system 
maintenance and enforcement.  The normalisation and celebration of violence, as a means for 
'conflict resolution' and as a badge of identification with social roles and hence with social norms 
that govern hierarchies of prestige and inequalities of resources, is a factor both in the socialisation 
of individuals into gender and other political identities, and in the enforcement of those roles and 
distributions.  Asymmetrical uses of violence are thought of, in these cultures and systems, as 
rightful: police officers rightfully win in battles with criminals (or vice versa in the genres of fiction 
that celebrate the criminal as hero); states win rightful wars (or lose them with right on their side).   
Orders of sexual, class, or ethnic identification and difference are enforced both by members of the 
counterpart group - as with the enforcement of exclusions such as those in the labour market or in 
culture; and by members of one's own group as with girls' policing of each others' attire and 
appearance, conduct and aspirations.   That is, the normalisation of violence in interpersonal 
relations, is a necessary condition of the normalisation of the established, socially approved, 
patterns of those relations and the concomitant distributions of resources, allocations of individuals 
to places in the hierarchy.   
Personal violence reflects the systematic violence of our society. The organised violence 
inflicted on people in the context of a war is an extension of that inflicted on one person by 
another, and of the violence of a system which pretends that everyone is equal whilst 
discriminating openly, though its schools, media, police and legal system.19 
 Third, this role of a normalised violence is associated with masculinity, in complex ways.  
The asymmetrical and 'socially rightful' enforcement of a gender hierarchy, whereby men as a 
group get more money, property, political power, social prestige, calories, valuable jobs and so on, 
is done to a greater degree by man to woman violence than it is by woman to woman violence 
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(although the latter is not unimportant); and it is done to a vanishingly small extent by woman to 
man violence (although, of course, female parents visit quite a lot of violence on boy children).  The 
perpetration of aggression, enforcement, exclusion, by men is attributed to propensities of men to 
these forms of violence.  In Piecing It Together and other such texts, the explanation is a socially 
based one of enforcement and maintenance of the system, which requires violence by those who are 
dominant in, and benefit most from, it.  Domination has a return to the dominator, not just 
quantitatively (getting more of scarce resources) but also positionally (by decreasing the pool of 
competition for these scarce resources, and due to the pay-off of positional dominance itself in sense 
of esteem, of security, and hence of investment in the status quo). 
 For the authors of Piecing It Together, an important element of feminist critique of violence is 
the focus on the self-defeating, self-negating, nature of assertions of male superiority.  The 
association of masculine violence and warmaking with fantasy is captured both in slogans like 'take 
the toys from the boys', and also in more sustained analyses of militarism.20   On the one hand, 
fantasy is responsible for the fantastic excess in violence, and in domination.  It deletes reason and 
rationality from male violence.  On the other, however, as violence operates to shore up male 
dominance, it undoubtedly tracks material interest.  It operates to rule out possibilities of 
egalitarianism or reason based moves to justice in the social order.   
 Fourth, on this account, this material and ideological context has a number of effects on 
women's political agency.  It raises the stakes, and generates reasonable fear.  A good number of 
words in the sources analysed emphasise fear as an impetus to action.21  Further, it generates the 
demand for responsibility: responsibility not to mirror the actions of the oppressor, responsibility 
for the well-being of future generations, responsibility for one's own actions in concert with others.22  
These feminist principles of political theory, strategy and tactics then mesh with the principles of 
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non-violence and resistance to war which have evolved in the pacifist and feminist-pacifist 
traditions, and in particular in the practice of non-violent resistance and direct action.  For many 
feminist pacifists in 1981, this analysis of violence, social structure, and political agency was 
sufficient justification for separate organisation.23 
 The authors of Piecing It Together offer an analysis that identifies feminist ideology and 
politics with non-violence and anti-militarism, and represents the Greenham Peace Camp as one 
form of exemplary feminist political action. At the same time, however, feminist scepticism and 
hostility towards Greenham was growing in intensity, especially after the very large mass gathering 
and blockade of the base in March 1983.24  The criticism on which we here focus was articulated in 
various texts, and the arguments of these critics were brought together in another multi-authored 
feminist volume Breaching the Peace. It identified a number of problems with the Greenham 
movement and the feminist theory that was inferred to underpin it. For the authors of Breaching the 
Peace, the women's peace movement was engaged in the wrong kind of political coalition, pursued 
the wrong kind of feminism, was centred on the wrong kind of femininity, offered the wrong kind 
of resistance, and focussed on the wrong kind of violence. 
We see the women’s peace movement as a symptom of the loss of feminist principles and 
processes – radical analysis, criticism and consciousness raising.25  
 The contributors to Breaching the Peace begin with a different fear from the fear of nuclear 
annihilation and a bleak future for their children than that which animates members of the women's 
peace movement.  They fear the loss of feminism.  Feminism has in the past lost out to peace 
movements, and it looks as though it might happen again.26   The coalition with pacifism is not a 
widening, but a liberalisation of feminism that threatens the decline of the autonomous feminist 
women's movement.27  Coalition means cooptation.28  It means - as coalitions with socialism, and 
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with liberal strategists, always have - that the demands of the late twentieth century autonomous 
women's movements:  equal pay, employment and education, for reproductive and sexual freedom, 
socialised childcare, and freedom from violence, would be put on the back burner, again, while 
feminists wait for peace (or socialism).   
 The problem, then, is that the women's peace movement represents the wrong kind of 
feminism.  Critics focus on the arguments, explicit, and also symbolically articulated, that displace 
political demands from women's rights to women's fears for their children, or concern for the 
planet.  Whatever the virtues of concern for future generations, there is a political concern that it 
effectively displaces feminist concern.29  A particular trap awaits those who pursue this line of 
argument:  the undoubted rhetorical power of women with children in buggies calling for an end to 
the threat of nuclear weapons comes at the cost of foregrounding the political identity of women as 
mothers.  Ruth Wallsgrove argues that, paradoxically, this parade of personal and intimate concern 
as a political demonstration has had the opposite effect from what we hope for from the feminist 
principle that 'the personal is political' (and which, as we have seen, is at the heart of the reasoning 
of members of the women's peace movement).  The problem is that the organisation, events and 
actions of 1981-3  had allowed participation, and personal change for many of the women involved, 
without immediate accountability and without hard thinking.30  This is because, according to these 
critics, the calls for 'peace', or 'disarmament', or to 'save the planet' are overly general to the point of 
vacuity.31  They are cheap calls to make, because there are no difficult negotiations, choices, 
sacrifices, trade-offs.32  Greenham, in particular, afforded an opportunity for some women to make 
personal changes in their family lives - to escape the family home, essentially - but not to take public 
political responsibility for the pursuit of the social change that would make that a political 
possibility for society.33 
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 This wrong kind of feminism is connected with the wrong kind of femininity. The actions of 
'holding hands around the base', it is argued, conduces to an idea of spirituality, and presents an 
attractive image of women, that does not have any transformative implications for daily life and 
systems.34  The mass demonstration of 'ordinary women' is entirely unthreatening politically, 
because this public event will be followed by the disappearance of the participants back into their 
private and personal lives.  The atmosphere of carnival, addressing the police with songs and 
clowning, has the effect of presenting the state itself as benign.35 
 The entire project, then, centres on the wrong kind of resistance.  First, these mass events 
give an 'illusion of the power of the crowd', and the appeal to the 'power of numbers' is a very 
straight and conventional appeal.36  There is a deep scepticism about participation in absolutely 
conventional democracy as usual - marches, petitions, chain letters, 'standing up to be counted'.  All 
of these add up to the making of requests, and endorsing a model of representation, when feminists 
know full well (or should do) that 'governments do not represent our interests.'37  As a contributor 
to Trouble and Strife argues in an article about policing and violence, the problem with the 'practice 
of democratic freedom' in the style of marches and demonstrations is that it ignores the 'deep 
entrenchment of the state in Britain'.38 
 For the feminist critics of the women’s peace movement, the focus on the inter-governmental 
level of events, such as the deployment of Cruise missiles in Europe, exactly misses the point, or 
rather several points.  First, the idea that 'war is the ultimate male violence' reinforces conceptions 
of the state and masculinity which feminism should challenge.     The authors of Breaching the Peace 
resist the idea of the state as 'ultimate', 'sovereign', 'transcendent' etc.  'The state', rather, is a process 
and institutionalisation of a particular kind of entrenchment of structures, legally, administratively, 
fiscally, socially and ideologically (in education, health etc) that is all around us in our daily lives.  It 
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is not a superstructure, up there high above us, bearing down.  'The state' in this sense pervades 
social, cultural, inter-personal and intimate relations.  The point of politics, on this view, is to work 
against those aspects of state power that are oppressive to individuals and to try to transform social 
power.39   Second, the idea of a 'hierarchy' of male violence participates in exactly the same kind of 
error:  male violence is pretty awful, in whatever guise it turns up.  War -  and rape in war, etc - is 
not worse just because it is in war.  A particular case might be worse, but that's because it's worse in 
the ordinary quantitative and qualitative measure by which we judge assaults and injuries to be 
worse and less worse.  From this point of view, there are good theoretical reasons for saying that the 
violence of daily life, in the streets and in the home, is 'worse'.  At least, there are very good reasons 
for thinking that these are the violences that need to be tackled politically:  “Let’s make it plain that 
men are the perpetrators of violence in all spheres and stop now the thoughtless clamour to 
promote peace as the only worthwhile goal”. 40  Third, it follows from this theory of state and 
violence that 'non-violent tactics' in the women's peace movement will be a problem.  That women 
only demos minimise violence is 'untrue': police will, of course, attack women.41 
 We have here set out the arguments of Piecing It Together and Breaching the Peace as two 
opposed and distinct positions.  The contributions to both volumes in fact take a more dialogic 
form, as contributors respond to points made by others, although attempts to minimise differences 
and to emphasise common ground, on matters of ontology and explanation, are less striking than is 
the continued gulf on matters of appropriate political action in terms of strategy and tactics.   The 
accusation that the actions of Greenham women are feminine rather than feminist, and are invested 
in female stereotypes, for instance, is responded to by several who, like Lynne Jones, emphasise the 
bodily transformation from conventional femininity that is required in participation in direct action 
in confrontation with military and police, and by participation in the camp more generally.42   
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 Questions of coalition became fatefully prominent amongst participants in the feminist anti-
nuclear peace movement.  First, dispute between those women at Greenham who were committed 
to new age spirituality and related varieties of environmentalism, and those who were more 
materialist in their political and social theory,  issued in public disagreements, and a heterogeneous 
range of plans, actions and attitudes in the complex phenomenon of ‘Greenham’.  Participants at the 
camp dealt with disagreement by way of a commitment to individual responsibility and a kind of 
anarchist tolerance.  But critics saw this strategy as evidence of the wrong, and confusing, kind of 
coalition.43   Second, disputes, and recriminations, developed between women at the camp who 
emphasised links with socialism and anti-racism, and those who were critical of the involvement of 
prominent activists from marxist and socialist traditions.  These sectarian divides were exacerbated 
by allegations, freely made by government and police, about USSR control of the peace movement 
in general, and of CND and Greenham women in particular.  These accusations were soon mirrored 
by suspicions about CIA infiltration of the camp.44  From the standpoint of our analysis of the 
dimensions of contention on these issues of violence and feminism it is not surprising that these 
divisions - about coalition with other political movements and parties - were severe, and that 
rehearsal of them tracked and accompanied the decline of this chapter of action in the women's 
peace movement.  For they turn on deep disagreements about whether forms of violence are 
fundamental or epiphenomenal.  The divisions at Greenham were divisions between women 
committed to forms of pacifism, non-violence and maternalism that we have located in cells f and g 
of Table 1, and activists committed to political coalitions against the state (cell k).  Activists 
defended the continuing strategy and tactic of harassment of state authorities, in particular in the 
years that followed when participants in the continuing camp at Greenham persistently tracked and 
attempted to disrupt the weapons exercises.45 
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   The view that violence is fundamental, however, also supports an inference to position (h), 
exemplified by the authors of Breaching the Peace, which is explicitly 'anti-pacifist', and committed to 
a feminist political project of fighting back against male violence, and related exploitation and 
oppression.  These feminist critics criticised the materialist maternalism position (g) because it 
blurred into a more radical maternalism based on a different account of sex differences - one which 
easily took up positions, and strategies, that emphasised 'spirituality' (both conventionally religious 
and counter-cultural), and a related kind of environmentalism (f).  From the point of view of the 
anti-pacifist critics, because goals were impossibly vague, appealing across a very wide range in a 
very general way, they could never put their defenders to the test of political commitment.  The 
strategy and tactics of mass public action set up an opposition between this form of public life, and 
an unaffected private life, to which participants exhausted by the public actions would inevitably 
return.  Confrontation with these particular symbolic and material institutions of the state - the 
police, the military, subsequently the magistrates and the prison authorities - was bound to fail. 
Feminist critics were particularly concerned that the specific goals and demands of feminism would 
be lost to those of anti-nuclear pacifism.46   
Nuclear arms are a symptom of the madness of patriarchy not the cause of our oppression. 
The suffragette movement’s energies were coopted and effectively dispersed by a great call to 
either fight for the country at war or to fight against the war for peace. 47 
 These critical, negative, arguments are coherent and cogent.  But they obviously beg the 
question of what feminists should do instead.  Within the direct criticism of the women's peace 
movement some clear alternatives are articulated. First of all, it is absolutely necessary to live 
differently - the everyday as the starting point is a repeated motif in Breaching the Peace.48  This does 
not mean living in a tent.  Perhaps it means - not living in a tent, but living in the world of work, 
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and school, and sociability, and political effort.  It does mean not consenting to or acquiescing in the 
structures that deprive women of rights and freedoms.  This entailed a degree of withdrawal from 
public popular and political culture.  It also meant avoiding collusion in work and professional life.  
Further, it meant engaging in positive campaigns and actions to support women who are 
attempting to oppose oppression, exploitation, and violence in the context of kinship, work, and 
social life.  So strategically the focus is on mid-range action, engagement with state and society at 
the level of the everyday, and an engagement with male violence in particular, with an analysis of 
its role in system and structure maintenance.  The emphasis there is on small to mid-scale projects, 
of a decidedly practical kind - help lines, refuges, training  -  and the networks and connections 
between these, including solidarity with similar projects in settings such as Soweto, West Africa and 
Bangladesh.49   This political effort is underpinned by critical analysis of popular culture - film, 
sport, alcohol - and analysis of the fates of women's campaigns and women's history. There is an 
emphasis on the propulsion of new analyses through public political discourse, and through action 
and employment, into state organisations. As we have seen, there is scepticism about the tactics and 
strategies of 'non-violence' in this political context.  The question of women's willingness to use 
political violence, though, and the relationships between violence, gender and feminism, are live 
ones and are by no means settled.   
  
Violence and politics. 
 All parties in the debates and disagreements analysed above agreed that feminism should be 
fundamentally concerned with opposing patriarchal violence and that the central case of 'violence' 
is the infliction of physical injury, using weapons including parts of the body as weapon.   
Campaigns for more just and effective recognition of rape and sexual assault in culture, society and 
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law, and campaigns for the removal of Cruise missiles from western Europe were as one in this 
respect.  Theoretically, violence was considered important because it was system maintaining.  
Normatively, all these activists considered that violence is a grave harm: as well as physical it 
causes psychological harm; the harms of violence are transferred through social networks - the 
friends and kin of victims are also harmed, and relationships can be destroyed.   
The significance of symbolic violence was more contentious within and between these 
groupings of opinion.  Given that the injury of bombing and shooting, sexual assault, or beating, 
was harmful and socially fateful, what should be said about the proliferation of symbols and 
representations that served to communicate the threat and reality of bombing, shooting, sexual 
assault and beating?  Was symbolic communication of a threat - an obscene gesture to a woman, or 
a joke that turned on the rightfulness of domestic violence - itself an act of violence?  How much 
difference did the symbolic integration, in military practice and discourse, of sexual violence and 
war make to those evils? Was girls' policing of one another with regard to dress, demeanour and 
actions, 'violent' in the way that state policing was?  Was a structure or system understood to be 
maintained, in part, by violence, itself violent?  There is disagreement - and not just between 
feminist thinkers of course - about these inferences, with some emphasising the violence of 
inequality and hierarchy themselves.  These complications in thinking about the nature of the harm 
in violence interacted with concerns about responsibility and with the question of how to approach 
the matter of women’s and/or feminist violence or non-violence.   
23 
 
Table 2: Violent strategy and justification 
 
 Willing to use violent 
strategy/ tactics 
Commitment to non-violent 
strategy/tactics 
Instrumental, means-end 
reason 
 
 
    a. 
 
  c. 
Expressive, symbolic reason 
 
 
 
    b. 
 
  d. 
 
Political actors frequently put forward instrumental reasons for the uses of violence, in the tradition 
of proposing (bad but justifiable) means for (good) ends.  However, equally frequently, and often 
because uncertainty made such instrumental reason dubious, expressive symbolic reasons, based on 
the aesthetics, or meanings, of violent energy, were proposed. The same dilemma between 
instrumentality and expressivity is evident in reasoning about non-violent action.  Table 2 shows in 
a schematic way four positions in relation to political violence: expressive and instrumental 
justifications for the uses of violence and for commitment to non-violent action.  Of course, this 
simplification conceals numerous intermediate and combination positions. In the context of debates 
between the women’s peace movements and their critics, for example, the absence of commitment 
to non-violence, which was articulated by many critics of Greenham, did not imply a willingness to 
use violence as such.50  Attitudes to political violence ranged from the undecided and uncertain, to 
the ambivalent.  Second, it is notable that expressive, symbolic, moves in justification were more or 
less ubiquitous in the sources analysed here,  often joined together with instrumental, means-end, 
reason.  For example, Gwyn Kirk argues that the instrumentality of violence is either unquestioned, 
or exaggerated (scepticism about instrumentality).   She also argues that peace cannot be achieved 
through violence (instrumentality).51    Such reasoning is obviously open to the instrumental 
challenge that peace won’t be achieved through the non-violence of the women’s peace movement 
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either.  But women’s use of singing and wailing is not only a strategy of assertive, non-violent, 
confrontation; it also symbolises a particular identity and set of values.52  This combination of a 
symbolic and a causal analysis of non-violence is repeated in Jones’ account of how sitting down in 
front of state authorities ‘works’, and in analyses of what it means for women to resist 
nonviolently.53   But as we have seen, critics offer a mirror image of Jones’ argument. Scott argues 
that the non-violent strategic practices characteristic of Greenham are self-defeating because they 
enact a version of femininity that reinscribes and also incites patriarchal violence.54 These practices 
reinscribe violence because they model women’s identity in passive terms (symbolic), and they 
incite violence directly through creating opportunities for (mostly) men (soldiers and police) to 
exercise violence against women (instrumental).55   
 All sides to the debates we have analysed agreed that the maintenance of clearly 
differentiated sex and gender identities and roles, and the association of men with violence and 
women with nurture, non-violence, and/or passivity were to be understood in something like 
socially constructive and historical terms.56  They disagree on what follows from this in terms of 
feminist political agency. On the one hand, it can be argued that the social relationship between 
femininity or femaleness and non-violence can be used strategically in order to expose and 
potentially to transform the violence of the state, of men or sub-sets of men as a group, of popular 
culture etc.  That is, the social reality of the structure allows the immanent critique of one half of the 
structure by the opposition in pursuit of the deconstruction and transformation of both sides.  On 
the other hand, of course, the historical facts of social construction mean that any identification of 
women with non-violence and men with violence is suspect; and a space is opened up for the 
(suppressed) reality of women’s violence. 
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 In the debates here analysed women’s violence is fully acknowledged, although the ethical 
and political dilemmas thus raised are hardly resolved.  For instance, the Feminism and Non-
Violence Study Group’s Piecing it Together includes discussion of the need for judgement with 
respect to violent resistance; the question of the role of self-defence and assertiveness training in 
feminist political action; the significance of militant action against violence against women; and the 
social facts of women’s brutality and violence and its social construction in a variety of forms such 
as depression, child-beating etc.57 At the same time, the authors of Piecing It Together are strongly 
resistant to the idea of any way of describing feminist resistance in terms that could be seen as ‘an 
open invitation to escalate female-initiated aggession’. 58 Some of the first person accounts of the 
Greenham movement and actions emphasise ambivalence, ambiguity and difficulty in the practice 
of non-violence.59  The disputes between women at Greenham over questions of coalition and 
strategy, of course, were suffused with experiences of aggression and questions of the significance 
of non-violence in contexts of mutual hostility and recrimination.60 
 Scepticism about non-violence rests in part on such ambivalence and ambiguity, as well as 
the strategic disagreements about peace campaigns against the state discussed earlier.  The 
ambivalence and ambiguity stems from the identification of varieties of violence against women as 
symptomatic of male dominance of state, society and culture, while being the key instrument for the 
maintenance of that dominance.  Strategically, feminist politics must focus on that theoretical and 
practical centrality, using a variety of strategies of autonomous organisation, dissent and 
opposition, engagement and challenge. As we have seen, contributors to Breaching the Peace were 
sceptical of the values and likely outcomes of strategies and tactics of non-violence. This is not to 
say there was any straightforward commitment to violence or force in political tactics – rather, 
reservation about ruling it out and calls for serious judgement prior to any decision to rule it in.   
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 Opposition to patriarchal violence was central to the feminist analyses and prescriptions 
gathered in Piecing It Together and Breaching the Peace. The fault lines between the positions of those 
endorsing the women’s peace movement as exemplary feminist politics and those accusing it of 
being anti-feminist are not wholly derivable from fundamentally different analyses of patriarchy, of 
the meaning of patriarchal violence or from different understandings of gender justice – even 
though there are a diversity of understandings at play.  In both cases opposition to patriarchal 
violence, in all its complexity, meant that effective feminist political agency depended on its divorce 
from that violence. Critiques and disagreements, as well as many instance of self-reflective 
ambivalence about appropriate forms of action, continually circled around the concern that feminist 
activists, wittingly or not, were actually reproducing the patriarchal violence to which they were 
opposed. Each party to the arguments outlined above needed to resolve the question of how to 
distinguish between feminist politics and violence.  The proponents of Piecing It Together, in order to 
do so, needed to draw a line between violence and non-violence.  Their critics needed to draw a 
clear line between male violence, and the feminist political struggle.  In the case of those identifying 
feminism with non-violence and opposition to war, this meant a divorce of feminist politics from all 
violence.  But attempts to repudiate violence altogether were haunted by the return of violence in 
the sense that feminist non-violent political action could be suspected of actually reproducing the 
patriarchal violence to which it was opposed. This was also the case for the feminist critics of 
pacifist and non-violent feminism.  In their case, the refusal to endorse the priority of peace, and (in 
some cases) an emphasis on 'fighting back' against violence against women, opened them to the 
same suspicion that their tactics and strategy were failing to break out of the structures and systems 
of gender-based violence. 
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Conclusion 
 The arguments of the 1980s feminists analysed above, and their attempts to draw, and to 
hold, the lines between violence and non-violence and between politics and violence in their own 
political practice, demonstrate that there is an irreducibly political dimension to attempts, in theory 
or practice, to draw and sustain these distinctions. The contributors to Piecing It Together and 
Breaching the Peace shared a great deal in their feminist critiques of violence and patriarchy. Their 
critiques of each other reflected opposing political judgments about the practice of feminist politics. 
Some of this opposition can be traced back to theoretical positions outlined in Table 1.  Some of it is 
traceable to the practical alternatives available to specific feminist actors at specific times and places.  
But a crucial part of the story is the active delimitation of perspective essential to any political 
action. In other words, in both cases theorists and activists had to override their own ambivalences 
and ambiguities about resistance to patriarchal violence in order to engage politically in that 
resistance. What we see in their contentions and reflections is the production of distinctions between 
politics and violence and between violence and non-violence. A production that is irreducible to 
prior theoretical commitments or practical constraints. 
 The feminists of Piecing It Together, in identifying non-violent feminist action in pursuit of 
peace as exemplary, actively obscured (though not without reservations) the violence of enacting 
‘feminine’ values as a way of overturning the gender order. In effect, they practiced one way of 
producing a distinction between (nonviolent) politics and violence, one that made sense in terms of 
their broader ideological commitments, but could also be seen, from the point of view of an 
alternative delimitation, as undermining those commitments. By contrast, their critics produced a 
different distinction between feminist politics and patriarchal violence, one that, from the point of 
view of the pacifist delimitation, was troublingly close to the very violence that it disavowed. For 
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us, looking back, the self-reflectiveness of feminist thinkers and activists engaged in these debates 
about the question of violence, brings the process of producing the difference between violence and 
political agency to the surface and reveals both the necessity and difficulty of successfully 
negotiating this difference for a politics defined by its opposition to violence   
 In the decades since the debates over Greenham in the UK the question of the relation 
between feminism, non-violence and peace politics has resurfaced in a variety of contexts, in 
organised feminist pacifist resistance to wars, in contentions over the role of women in the military 
or terrorist movements, in the association of women with peace in the 2002 UN Resolution 1325 and 
theoretically in debates about the possibilities of a feminist just war.61 Feminists continue to disagree 
and to seek a stable solution to the question of the relation between feminist political agency and 
goals and the practice and aims of non-violence. Looking back on the 1980s debates, what they tell 
us is that there is no view from nowhere to determine which of the protagonists of this particular set 
of feminist encounters read the runes of resistance to patriarchal violence correctly. The debates are 
interesting not for what they resolve but for what they exhibit in terms of the slippery and always 
contestable political production of the relation and distinction between politics and violence and 
between violence and non-violence. 
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